Procedural planning theory: The synthetic necessity by Muller, John
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*This paper is based on the paper presented at the
international planning theory conference "La Teor­
ia Nelle Pratiche Di Pianijicozione'; held in Turin
in September 1986.
Procedural planning theory has, over a 
period of many years, been subjected to 
criticism on various grounds. The cur­
rent critique is based on the perception 
that the procedural model is divorced 
from context - that it is a theoretical 
construct separated from socio-political 
reality. The tendency to separate the 
procedural from the substantive fields of 
planning theory has been reinforced by a 
fairly broad body of work concerned 
with the classification of planning the­
ory. While the classification typologies 
have value in the comparative analysis 
they provide of the attributes of various 
theoretical approaches, they have tend­
ed to negate or neglect the significance 
of the connectivity between theories. 
The view presented in this paper is that 
procedural and substantive connections 
are essential to planning-in-practice and 
that if procedural theory fails to accom­
modate these linkages, it should be re­
cast in non-theoretical methodological 
form. The elements of planning theory 
can then be freely connected or synthe­
sized, transferred to the methodology of 
planning and incorporated in the prac­
tice of planning. 
1. PROCEDURAL THEORY
- THE DEBATE
One of the Jong-standing and distinc­
tive features attaching to procedural 
planning theory must surely be the criti­
cal debate to which it has been, and still 
is, subjected. The quintessential 
procedural model, the rational - com­
prehensive process, has been dis­
paraged and denigrated for some two to 
three decades but, as Dalton (1986) has 
recently reiterated, it has been decidedly 
slow in succumbing to the attack . The 
early and familiar rejection by 
Braybrooke and Lindblom (l 963) of the 
tenets of rational-comprehensive plan-
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Beplanningsteorie word jare lank reeds 
op verskeie gronds/ae gekritiseer. Die 
huidige kritiek berus op die waarneming 
dat die teorie van bep/anning nie ver­
·band hou met die konteks waarin dit
moet funksioneer nie, d.w.s. dat dit 'n
teoretiese skeppirig is, verwyder van
sosio-politiese werk/ikhede. Die neiging
om aspekte van prosedure te skei van die
substantiewe terreine van bep/annings­
teorie word verder onderhou deur 'n
aansien/ike hoevee/heid studie wat han­
de/ oor die k/assifikasie van bep/an­
ningsteorie.
A/hoewe/ die waarde van k/assifikasie­
tipes in 'n verge/ykende analise van die
bydraes van die verskillende teoretiese
benaderings le, neig hu//e om die waarde
van skake/ing tussen die teoriee te ig­
noreer.
Die uitgangspunt van hierdie artikel is
dat die skakeling tussen teoriee van
beplanning en substantiewe skake/ings
noodsaaklik vir praktiese bep/anning is.
As die teoriee van prosedures nie daarin
s/aag om hierdie skake/ing te bewerk­
ste//ig nie, moet dit deur nie-teoretiese
vorms vervang word.
Die e/emente van beplanningsteorie kan
dan vrylik gekonnekteer of sintetiseer,
oorgedra na bep/anningsmetodologie en
in beplanningspraktyk inge/yf word.
ning, led Bolen (1967), twenty years 
ago, to pose the "real question" as to 
whether this model could, or should, 
adapt to meet the challenges of the crit­
ics at that time. Although the current 
set of challenges draw strength from ar­
guments other than the limitations of 
man's technical problem-solving capa­
bilities, the same question could be (and 
indeed is being) asked today. 
It is now co91mon cause that the burden 
of the present critique of procedural 
theoty is in the perceived inability of the 
procedural model to recognize and ac-
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commodate socio-political reality. 
Procedural theory is viewed as having 
collapsed in the face of the radical, 
humanist and pragmatic offensive 
(Healey, McDougall and Thomas 1982); 
as having abdicated its paradigmatic 
status (Alexander, 1984); as a distinctive 
form of thought and action that is un­
connected with the substance of the real 
world and is thus, in the familiar words 
of Thomas (1979) "contextless" and 
"contentless"; and as "indeterminate 
abstraction" embodying "vapid empiri­
cal content" (Scott and Roweis 1977). 
T he latter argue that the abstract ra­
tionality of procedural theory disguises 
the instrinsically political quality of 
planning intervention by transforming 
that intervention into no more than 
administrative decision-making rules. 
Substance and procedure are thus 
divorced; a separation that Roweis 
(1983:143) characterizes as a "standard 
article of faith in mainstream planning 
theory". The quest to link procedural 
and substantive theory is rejected by 
Taylor (1984) who puts the proposition 
that procedural theory is a formal or a 
priori conceptual theory intrinsically 
unconcerned with empirical or synthe­
tic considerations, and that materialist 
critiques of the theory are thus falla­
cious. This proposition is in turn ques­
tioned by Huw Thomas (1985:59) who 
asserts that" ... the approach to analyt­
ical philosophy must be one which is 
conscious of the political and moral 
context of philosophical debates .. :• 
This dialectic is appealing and the argu­
ments and counter arguments are by 
and large persuasive, but one is led to 
wondet where the intellectual muscle­
flexing is now leading; where and how it 
contributes to the furtherance of plan­
ning-in-practice. While accepting the 
bond of reciprocity between theory and 
practice, it is a matter of concern when 
the trappings of theory are used to 
smother the problems and promise of 
practice. Reference to the philosophy of 
science - to the principles of ration­
ality and scientific method - shows 
that planning procedures are by nature 
neither rationally nor empirically pure, 
and it is therefore questionable - prob­
ably presumptious - to expect purity 
in procedural theory. Accordingly, since 
procedural theory has limitations when 
measured agairist the principles of 
"real" or accepted theory, perhaps it 
would be sensible to remove it from the 
rarified realms of theory and recast it in 
methodological form. Methodology is, 
after all, the area of concern and con­
tent of procedural theory and it is in this 
area that the theory makes its contribu­
tion to the practice of planning. 
This is the approach that is adopted in 
this paper. The focus is on planning
procedure rather than procedural the­
ory. In order to illustrate the manner in 
which theory can inform and support 
practice, elements will be drawn from 
the field of planning theory and (freed 
of the bonds of theoretical rigour) ap-
plied to the methodology of planning. 
The intention is to delve into theory and 
extract elements pertinent to practical 
planning procedures - an approach 
which in principle emulates that of Wil­
liam James, the American philosopher 
of pragmatic persuasion, who made 
"raids into philosophy" in order to re­
late academic philosophy with com­
mon life. This approach will gather 
together those proced1,1ral, substantive 
and contextual elements in planning 
theory that have long been construed as 
separate - and which have been pre-, 
sented as such in various models or 
typographies on the classification of 
theory. Inasmuch as the predilection 
among theorists is divorce and deline­
ate theory into discrete camps is pro­
bably most pronounced in these cate­
gorization models, they can usefully 
serve as a means of identifying and syn­
thesizing those theoretical elements 




The differentiation between procedural 
and substantive theory is clearly the 
most common and recurrent feature of 
classification models. This twofold 
categorization appears to have had its 
beginnings in the distinction between 
theories of the planning process and 
theories concerning phenomena which 
Hightower identified in his study of 
planning school curricula in the late 
1960s. In this early entry into the field 
of theory classification, Davidoff and 
Reiners' Choice Theory (1962) and 
Banfield's Conceptual Scheme (1955) 
are cited as procedural theories, which 
are "properly identified as planning 
theory", and Reilly's Law is presented as 
an example of phenomena or substance 
which is "not part of the theory of plan­
ning per se" (Hightower 1969:326). The 
qualification is made that the distinc­
tion between process and phenomena is 
"sometimes arbitrary" and that certain 
areas of activity such as citizen partici­
pation enter the "boundary zone be­
tween procedural and substantive the­
ory" (Hightower, 1969:327). 
The selection by Hightower of Choice 
Theory as a prime example of ,proce­
dural theory is not surprising. Its three­
stage process of value formulation -
means identification - effectuation 
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was seen as a work of seminal impor­
tance when it was first published in the 
early 1960s and remains recognized as 
such today. Less well recognized and 
remembered is Davidoff and Reiners' 
(1962:37) concluding assertion that, 
while it had become necessary to focus 
on planning method, "procedures and 
substance cannot be treated separate­
ly". They state unambiguously that the 
planning act or process derives from a 
consideration of the substantive pro­
perties of the world-as-it-is. Choice 
Theory is nevertheless classified outside 
the boundary zone as pure procedural 
theory and even today is described as 
perhaps the most articulate expression 
of the rational planning model (Alex­
ander, 1984). 
Faludi (1972:7) accepts Hightower's ex­
plicit distinction and echoes it in the 
familiar split between theory of plan­
ning (procedural) and theory in plan­
ning (substantive). In suggesting how­
ever that the categorization "should not 
result in an entirely separate develop­
ment of the two", he acknowledges the 
relationship between the two. The ele­
ment of mutual exclusion is implicitly 
recognized as a denial of factual condi­
tions - as indeed it should be. A plan­
ning procedure is a methodological 
response to an issue within prevailing 
societal conditions (substantive reality) 
and these conditions are transformed 
through planning intervention (proce­
durally structured) into new sets of con­
ditions, which must then impact on sub­
sequent procedural approaches. If, as 
Roweis (1983) states, it is not possible to 
describe how planners should plan 
without reference to substance - which 
is surely true - then the differentiation 
between theories of planning and the­
ories in planning must be rejected. 
The general acceptance of the split pro­
cedural/substantive model as common 
cause in planning circles would seem to 
make rejection a difficult proposition. 
Statements that address the inter­
relationship of the two are frequently 
vague: the " ... main problem with this 
dichotomous classification is that the 
line between substantive and procedu­
ral theory is blurry . . :• (Hudson, 
1979:396). It is precisely because there is 
no line between the two that the inter­
face appears blurred. It is, in an intellec­
tual and practical sense, not a line but 
an overlap - a meshing of the one with 
the other - and it is for this reason that 
delineation is found problematic. Hud­
son (1979:396, footnote) does in fact 
make the point that "procedures are 
often specialized in their application to 
particular substantive problem areas. 
Typically, in fact, a new procedure is 
invented to deal with a particular pro­
blem". Excluding the questionable no­
tion of regular procedural invention, 
this is a common sense statement that 
serves to highlight the practical links 
between procedure and substance. 
McCallum (1/974) presents another 
view. In support of the contention that 
the "confused state of planning theory" 
results from a lack of adequate distinc­
tion between fundamentally different 
sub-sets of planning theory, he intro­
duces an additional component. The 
body of theory is divided into three: 
theories of society, of the generic plan­
ning process and of urban/regional 
phenomena. Emphasis is placed on the 
heterogeneity of the field of planning 
theory and the "real differences be­
tween qualitatively distinct sub-sets of 
the field" (1974:739). The tripartite 
classification results from a separation 
of societal and phenomenal issues, pre­
viously accommodated under the com­
mon substantive umbrella. Inasmuch as 
theories of society incorporate the 
values and decisions of the formal insti­
tutions of society, and it is those institu­
tional or political decisions of society 
that give rise to the spatial and socio­
economic patterns contained within 
theories of urban/regional pheno­
mena, the split simply creates a gulf 
across which unnecessary bridges must 
be built. Further, and as indicated pre­
viously, the removal of the decision­
based theories of the "generic planning 
process" from the institutional contexts 
within which planning operates, plac�s 
plannirig in a vacuum. And it is of 
course largely against this scenario that 
the critique of the procedural mod\!! is 
directed. 
Published at the same time as McCal­
lum's article, Friedmann and Hudsons' 
"Knowledge and Action: a Guide to 
Planning Theory" (1974) reviews the 
traditions of planning theory primarily 
in terms of Hightower's planning pro­
cess category. In what is probably still 
the broadest coverage of the attributes 
of procedural theory in the classifica­
tion idiom, the authors identify four in­
tellectual traditions and associated 
cross-influences. It could be argued 
that the tradition of rationalism consti­
tutes the o_nly category accurately cor­
relating with Hightower's procedural 
definition; that the humanism of the 
philosophical synthesis tradition is far 
removed from the methodological con­
cerns of planning procedure and that 
the transference of the tenets of the or­
ganization development tradition to the 
institutional processes of planning is 
(by the author's own admission) pro­
blematic. However, Friedmann and 
Hudsons' (1974:3, 5) statement that the 
"compartmentalisation is by no means 
watertight'\, and their search for pat­
terns of "cross-fertilization and synthe­
sis among the traditions which have 
been separated in the past .. :• serve to 
underscore the contention that classes 
of theory should not be isolated. This 
becomes clear when a few of the semi­
nal works cited and classified in their 
paper are extended from one category 
to another. The philosophical writings 
of Mannheim enter the tradition of ra­
tionalism through the means-ends con­
ceptions of functional and substantial 
rationality; Dahl and Lindblom's work 
belongs as much to the rationalism tra­
dition as to that of philosophical syn­
thesis (in which it is placed) since their 
incrementalist decision model consti­
tutes both an interpretation of and reac­
tion to the premises of rationality, and 
the four-stage conceptual plan derived 
from Meyerson and Banfield's Chicago 
study obviously moves beyond the tra­
dition of empiricism into that of ration­
alism. Etzioni's model of the active so­
ciety is located within the tradition of 
philosophical synthesis - logically so, 
since his concept of societal guidance is 
pertinent to the work of the planning 
theorists of the new humanism school. 
Etzioni could, however, have been ac­
corded equal prominence in the ration­
alism category, where he receives little 
more than a passing reference. The 
meshing of elements of the synoptic 
and incremental decision processes in 
his mixed scanning strategy is in itself of 
importance to planning procedure, but 
the synthesizing of the strategy with 
social and political systems is certainly 
of comparable significance. In analys­
ing the levels of power, control and con­
census in totalitarian and democratic· 
societies, and relating these to mixed 
scanning, incremental and rationalistic 
models, Etzioni (1967, I �68) provides a 
telling example of the reciprocal rela­
tionship of substance and procedure. 
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The interaction between political struc­
ture and planning procedure is accepted 
by McConnell (1981). He expresses the 
view that "because planning practice is 
dependent on the sanction of those 
with political power on each level of 
government with a responsibility for 
planning, planning theory must be 
related to political theory if it is to relate 
to practice". In other words, planning 
practice must inevitably be related to 
political systems. He goes on to say that 
since planners are concerned with so­
cietal well-being in their decision­
making processes, planning theorising 
should be moderated by ethical reason­
ing. The politico-ethical dimension 
then gives rise to an additional cate­
gory: to theories in planning and the­
ories of planning is added a third 
category, "social theories for plan­
ning". This latter classification is per­
ceived as offering explanations of, and 
prescriptions for, society, and as relat­
ing to political and moral theory. It also 
explains "why planning is as it is". The 
correlation between planning and polit­
ical theory has been illustrated else­
where: Fainstein and Fainstein (1971) 
draw analogies between traditional, 
user-oriented, advocacy and incremen­
tal planning, and technocratic, demo- . 
cratic, socialist and liberal political the­
ories respectively. Studies such as this 
reveal the political values that under­
pin various planning procedures and in­
dicate why certain societies favour and 
adopt certain procedures rather than 
others. Planning method relates to po­
litical culture - as illu·strated by the 
chosen procedural approach in any 
country at particular times. 
Hudson's SITAR classification (1979) 
is, unlike those previously discussed, 
not derivative of the procedural/sub­
stantive convention, but is a mix of 
methodology (synopticism), political 
analysis (radicalism), professional role 
(advocacy), planning style (transactive 
planning) and decision-making ap­
proach (incrementalism). The five tra­
ditions, which are shown to have dis­
tinctive internal attributes, are sub­
jected to comparison on the basis "of a 
uniform set of criteria. Hudson (1979) 
accepts that the selected traditions and 
evaluative criteria are matters of per­
sonal choice but does not query the va­
lidity of entering upon a comparative 
analysis of disparate approaches with 
essentially different purposes and per-
spectives. Can a radical political phi­
losophy be rigorously and directly com­
pared with a sequentially structured 
methodology? While the answer is no, 
the conclusions drawn from the com­
parative study have value: "systematic 
evaluation of historical precedents like 
these would help create more realistic 
strategies for getting diverse traditions 
to work together ... The real issue is 
whether any planning style can be effec­
tive without parallel imputs from other 
complementary and countervailing tra­
ditions. According to Hudson (1979: 
396) the synoptic planning tradition ...
has serious blind spots, which can only
be covered by recourse to other plan­
ning traditions". These sentiments pro­
vide direction but fall short of explana­
tions and illustrations as to how, and
in what circumstances, planning ap­
proaches can be combined.
Hudson suggests that advocacy plan­
ning does not replace synoptic plan­
ning, but provides the latter process 
with a broader perspective on issues 
such as the public interest. Conversely, 
advocacy can itself adopt much of the 
synoptic m�thod in the production of 
alternative plans, while adhering to the 
principle of promoting and articulating 
the interest of disadvantaged groups. 
Integration of role and method is evi­
dent here. This is not without sig­
nificance since writings on the role of 
the planner have in the past frequently 
excluded consideration of the proce­
dure or methodology which would give 
practical meaning to the role. Media­
tion is interesting in this context: Web­
ber (1978:7) perceives the purpose of 
the mediator/facilitator as being the 
opening up of governmental processes 
to all parties by "improving the process 
of public debate and public decision", 
but is not explicit in respect of the prac­
tical means of doing so. In addressing 
· the function of the planner within the
state apparatus, Roweis (1983) sees ur­
ban planning as professional mediation
in territorial politics - as the interpre­
tation of territorial realities and the
effect which such knowledge-based in­
terpretation has on political actions.
The general thrust is on the planning
function in the production or reproduc­
tion of workable spatial organization
and not on methodological prescrip­
tion. More recently however, Susskind
and Ozawa (1984) have used a number
of case studies to illustrate the modus
operandi of mediation, and in doing so 
have provided useful (if largely apoliti­
cal) indicators of the ways in which par­
ticular planning roles incorporate 
procedural approaches appropriate to 
circumstances or context. Similarly, the 
application of the process of strategic 
choice in Dutch planning practice 
(Dekker and Mastop, 1979) could be 
regarded as a methodological interpre­
tation of the tenets of incremental 
decision-making, the successive rounds 
of problem definition and comparison 
being consistent with Lindblom's me­
thod of successive limited comparisons. 
Strategic choice occupies a prominent 
position in Faludi's (1982:82) three 
planning theory "paradigms" - being 
pertinent to his decision-centred view 
of planning; the "heir to the throne 
after the abdication of procedural plan­
ning theory". The decision-centred 
view, together with the object-centred 
and two control-centred views of plan­
ning, constitute the components of this 
classification. Unlike his earlier cate­
gorization, Faludi now enters the poli: 
tical domain. Marxist ideology is equa­
ted with the total control-centred 
approach, liberalist concepts with the 
partial control-centred approach and 
democratic ideals with the decision­
centred view of planning. The conver­
gence between the latter view ·and the 
procedural model is clear: the �ork of 
Banfield, Davidoff and Reiner, and 
Friend and Jessop, is cited as precedent. 
Although Geddes' 'incipient procedural 
approach is seen by Faludi (1982:90) as 
carrying with it "the seeds of the deci­
sion-centred view", it is interpreted sole­
ly as object-centred and characterized 
as a "fallacious planning doctrine". 
Simplistic as it appears today, Geddes' 
model has made a clear (yet unsung) 
contribution to planning: it represents 
the first attempt to join civic substance 
with a structured decision-aiding me­
thodology. 
Ultimately, and interestingly, Faludi 
returns to his previous procedural/ 
substantive dichotomy by questioning 
whether a separation of the two cate­
gories is possible in decision-making, 
and whether the fundamental problems 
facing planners do not require solutions 
different to those conventionally ad­
vanced. The questions are rhetorical: 
the substance of particular problems 
requires the application of appropriate 
procedures to generate solutions pecu-
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liar to the problems. 
The final classification model to be 
considered is that of Healey, McDou­
gall and Thomas (1982). Their concern 
is that of the plurality of planning posi­
tions and the lack of critical evaluation 
and understanding of those theoretical 
positions. The discussion moves from 
the premise that various theoretical 
stances - such as those held by the po­
litical economy, humanist and prag­
matic schools - have fairly recently 
emerged in opposition to, or as further 
developments of, procedural planning 
theory. Their arguments are interesting: 
social and advocacy planning are classi­
fied as developments of procedural the­
ory, and as being attached to the pro­
motion of sectoral values while accept­
ing "the general method" of planning. 
Thus the methodological or procedural 
convention is construed as capable of 
accommodating the interests of the dis­
advantaged under a social or advocacy 
planning approach. Activities falling 
under the implementation and policy 
category are similarly developmental to 
procedural theory in that "theoretical 
perspectives shift around the function­
alism typical of procedural theory". In­
crementalism is presented as a proce­
dural development in that it attempts to 
construct an alternative · decision­
making methodology. While the incre­
mental approach arguably, and indeed 
originally, stands in opposition to the 
rational-comprehensive model, its 
recognition as an outgrowth of the lat­
ter model is obviously valid. The major 
opposition resides in the Marxist-based 
new political economy school which 
presents procedural theory as a mecha­
nism of the capitalist state, the produc­
tive mode of whi_ch perpetuates un­
equal resource distribution and hence 
class conflict. The rational, technical 
and apolitical underpinnings of the 
synoptic method and its offspring have 
been roundly discredited through the 
critical analysis and explanations of ad­
vanced capitalist society by the propo­
nents of the political economy ap­
proach. The radical left has thereby 
broadened the planning fraternity's un­
derstanding of socio-economic organi­
zation and the power base of the state, 
but has offered little in the way of 
prescription or procedure to the plan­
ner . 
The radical new humanism position is 
also placed by Healey, McDougall and 
Thomas (1982:17) in opposition to the 
procedural model, but again this an­
tithetical approach offers planning no 
modus operandi - it tells planners 
"what they should do in a different 
world but (says) little about what to do 
now". This pithy statement serves to 
underscore the previously-made point 
on the need to extend theoretical ap­
proaches into the methodological do­
main, if such approaches are to be 
amenable to practical implementation. 
3. ELEMEN TS OF CLASSIFIED
THEORIES
The classification of planning theory is 
not in itself a field of theory. It is essen­
tially an analytical exercise that seeks to 
uncover the underlying characteristics 
and premises of the areas of intellectual 
investigation which fall under the gen­
eral heading of planning theory. As a 
form of analysis, it is not concerned 
with synthesis; the primary thrust is 
that of disaggregation. The classifica­
tion models have accordingly separated 
out fields of planning theory in various 
ways. (Figure 1) In so doing they have 
tended either to sever the connections 
between the fields or have failed to 
show how and where the connectivity 
occurs. It is of course this which has 
occasioned criticism of procedural the­
ory by Thomas and others; it is this that 
Roweis has attempted to correct and it 
is this separation that, in the analytical 
philosophical view of Taylor, should be 
regarded as theoretically proper. It is 
primarily this connective issue that has 
precipitated the procedural theory im­
passe. 
If however the concern is with practical 
issues of planning procedure rather 
than the nuances of theory (which is the 
stance adopted in this paper), then ele­
ments can be taken from the body of 
theory and synthesised to show the.fac­
tual interdependency of the substantive 
and procedural components of plan­
ning. The eight classification models 
reviewed previously have isolated and 
categorised a variety of theories and, 
hence, elements. Of these elements, a 
few are common to all models, some 
appear in the majority of the models 
and others, although not explicitly 
recognised in all models, have a sig­
nificance that should be acknowledged. 
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vide the basis for a synthetic framework 
for planning theory - for a framework 
developed around the interrelation­
ship of the elements of theoretical ap­
proaches. These elements are sum­
marised as follows: 
- The political system. The proposi­
tion that the political dimension ex­
tends across the planning field is no
longer a matter of debate. It is, perhaps,
largely through the work of the the­
orists of Marxist persuasion that there
is now a broad acceptance of the bond
between planning and politics, and that
between the planning function and the
operations of the state. Since political
parameters are perceived by the critics
as absent in procedural theory, it is
necessary that the linkage of politics
with procedure (and indeed with oth�r
aspects of planning) be demonstrated.
The fundamental importance of the po­
litical system has only fairly recently
been reflected in classification models
- it is touched upon by Hudson and is
thereafter more clearly incorporated in
the categorizations of McConnell
Healey et al and Faludi (1982).
- The institutional strncture. The po­
litical system finds expression in the
formal institutions of the state and so­
ciety. These are the instruments of pow­
er, through which the policy-making,
resource distribution and other control
mechanisms are exercised. Planning
operates largely within the formal in­
stitutional structure, but not exclusive­
ly, as Dyckman (1983) demonstrates.
The less formal institutions - citizen
groups, community organizations and
the like - also bear upon planning ac­
tivity. Advocacy and mediation are ob­
vious examples. The institutional ele­
ment is evident in the work of McCal­
lum, Friedmann and Hudson, Faludi
and Healey, �cDougall and Thomas.
- Socio-economic conditions. The so­
cial and economic environment is of 
course a contextual element of plan­
ning. Socio-economic conditions are 
indicative of the efficacy (or otherwise) 
of state policy and have been at the base 
of much of the theorising in the' plan­
ning discipline. The justifiable concern 
with the circumstances of disadvan­
taged sectors of society has, for exam­
ple, been extended from early sociologi­
cal and physical studies into the fields 
of political reform (Fainstein and Fain­
stein, 1982) and democratic decision-
making (Webber, 1978). The socio-eco­
nomic surrounds of planning activity 
are contained within the sustantive the­
oretical categories in the majority of the 
classification models previously dis­
cussed. 
- Spatial organization. The preceding
elements are ultimately manifest in pat­
terns of land use, land development and
land values - all of historical and con­
temporary import to planning. The ear­
ly studies emphasizing the physical end­
results of land use planning retain rele­
vance, but have (in a theoretical sense at
least) been supplemented by more prob­
ing investigations into the political un­
derpinnings of territorial allocations
(Roweis, 1983), state involvement in
areas such as housing (Marcuse, 1982)
and the provision of public services
(Rich, 1982). Spatial organization is a
substantive issue and is covered in the
"phenomena" classifications of High­
tower and McCallum, and in the sub­
stantive and object-centred categories
in the two Faludi models.
Ethical stance. The four contextual ele­
ments outlined above are subject to 
morally-grounded interpretation by the 
planner. This interpretation, this exer­
cise of professional ethics, has a direct 
impact on the way he executes his re­
sponsibilities. Issues central to the plan­
ner's ethical stance - conscienc�; obli­
gations, responsibilities and values -
have been fairly extensively covered in 
the literature recently (Klosterman, 
1978; Howe and Kaufman, 1979; Bolen, 
1983) and serve to indicate that neutral 
attitudes to political and societal'condi­
tions are no longer tenable. Ethics has 
deep and historical philosophical con­
notations and is tied to theoretical in­
terpretations of reality: socio-histori­
cal, politico-economic, epistomological, 
phenomenological, etc (de Neufville 
1983). Such theories give direction t� 
ethical approaches. Communications 
theory in the work of the critical the­
orists is an example. With the excep­
tions of Friedmann and Hudson, who 
en�er the ethical field in their philoso­
ph1cal synthesis category, McCallum, 
who touches on ethics briefly, arid 
McConnell who invokes the Rawlsian 
theory of justice in his "theories for 
planning" category, the classification 
models are silent on this issue. 
-
_
Planning role. The contextual, theo­
retical and ethical elements make up the 
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crucible in which the role of the planner 
is formed. The planner's role has been 
variously defined over the years: techni­
cian, analyst, facilitator, mediator, 
teacher, inventor (Webber, 1978), en­
trepreneur, administrator, advocate and 
guerrilla (Alexander, 1979). But the 
manner in which the role emerges from 
the theoretical and practical context -
and the extent to which it is consistent 
with the perceptions and perspectives 
attaching to the context - is not infre­
quently obscure. The correlation of in­
strumental rationality with community­
based utopian visions of the good life is, 
for example, found "ironic'' by Dyck­
man (1983). There is, similarly, a !�ck of 
clarity in the transference of the plan­
ning role to a compatible procedural 
approach: " ... Friedman gives no agen­
d� to guide transactive dialogue, and 
Lmdblom provides neither size nor di­
rection for any increment in particular.' 
(1:foch, 1984:341). The issue of the plan­
mng role - if not its connections - is 
addressed at varying levels of detail by 
Friedmann and Hudson, Hudson, 
Healey et al and Faludi. 
- Planning procedure. All the classifi�
cation models incorporate procedure as
a category of planning theory. As ob­
served previously, the practical realisa­
tion of the goals of any pla.nning ap­
proach requires the application of an
appropriate methodology. It is surely in
the nature of a professional discipline
- medical, legal or any other - to seek
to resolve a problem through the use of
�uitable modus operandi, and planning 
1s not an exception. The overriding con­
sideration is, however, that of the suita­
bility, the relevance, the appropriate­
ness of the adopted planning procedure 
in rrjation to the contextual, theoretical 
and ethical elements. There is,. to state 
the obvious, no single procedure capa­
ble of resolving all problems and no 
problem amenable to all procedures. 
The outright rejection of the synoptic 
model fails to recognize its latent 
propensity for modification, for adap­
tation to circumstances, or to ac­
knowledge that the most effective 
methodology may well be a sensible 
mix of the attributes of more than one 
procedural approach (Muller, 1982). In 
the end, planning procedure or metho­
dology must address, and be informed 
by, the political, social, economic, ins 
stitutional and spatial issues that con­
stitute the surrounds of planning - as 
well as by the ethical and operational 
(role) issues that derive from those sur­
rounds. 
Procedure is thus tied to context, and to 
the obvious extent that problems reside 
within and develop out of a particular 
context, and exhibit characteristics 
symptomatic of that context, it follows 
that problem and procedure are in­
separable. Adam's (1932: 15) adage of 
the early 1930s is still apposite: "The art 
of planning is as much the art of per­
ceiving the problem to be solved as it is 
the art of presenting a design for its so­
lution". Accurately identified, the pro­
blem should function as a determinant 
of not only the methodology to be used 
in the search for a viable solution, but 
also as a means of exposing contextual 
conditions - which then bear directly 
upon the role and ethical attitude of the 
planner. 
4. SYNTHETIC FRAMEWORK
' The framework illustrated here (Figure 
2) incorporates the elements identified
in the preceding section.
POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 
The linkages between the elements -
horizontal, vertical and diagonal - in­
dicate the interlacing nature of plan­
ning theories, and thereby confront the 
practice of separating and delineating 
theories into discrete categories. 
While the intensity of the interconnec­
tivity between the various elements is 
not constant and, indeed, may vary 
with personal interpretation, the fact 
that there is a definite form of connec­
tion between each and every element is 
deducible from the framework. For ex­
ample, the vertical link 1-3-6 joins the 
political system with the ethical stance 
and role of the planner. To the obvious 
extent that the "question is not whether 
planning will reflect politics, but whose 
politics will it reflect" (Long in Kloster­
man, 1978:39), planning cannot but 
enter ethical field. If the planner is 
party to the promotion of public policy 
objectives, it must be assumed that the 
dictates of his conscience and values 
permit acceptance of those objectives. 
An adherent to Rawl's principles of 
justice would support distributive poli­
cies which benefit the disadvantaged, 
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and would be morally bound to reject 
those institutional policies that further 
enti:ench the favoured position of the 
affluent. Bolen (1983) refers to the 
professional pull between the teleologi­
cal and deontological ethical view: 
whether good ends should be sought 
regardless of means or whether good 
ends should be forfeited if the means 
are intrinsically wron:g. Ethical judge­
ment of the defensibility of politically 
based institutional policies (or, equally, 
of private sector programmes) now falls 
squarely within the planner's bailiwick 
- he can no longer assume the d·is­
credited stance ofa neutral, value-free
scientist, technician or administrator.
The planner's ethical position extends
logically to that of the planner's role.
The early value-free planner g_ained
guidance from logical-positivist and ra­
tional means-ends approaches to sup­
port his role as a technical expert. Now,
the ethical concern with political and
social equality, which stem from the
ideals of democratic theory, carry
through to the representational prin­
ciples of the advocacy role. The analyti­
cal critics of capitalism have a moral
stance which leads them to socialist
theory and on to largely undefined roles
supportive of welfare and oppositional
to market capitalism (Fainstein and
Fainstein, 1982).
The diagonal link 2-4-6 correlates the
role of the planner with planning proce­
dure and institutional structure. This
introduces, inter alia, the function of
the planner operating within the bu­
reaucracy, and the associated conflict
situation between official policy and
planning ideology that can arise in
problematic planning environments.
The difficulty of undertaking an ad­
vocacy role in city government - of at­
tempting to reconcile sectoral interests
with the public interest - illustrates the
point. The activities of the private sec­
tor advocate, mediator or transactive
planner are perforce located within the
parameters of the institutionalized
power structure of the state. These
parameters also serve to define the
procedural approaches open to the
planner, in the form of statutory
prescriptions attaching to planning per­
mission.
The split procedural/substantive con­
vention is addressed in the 1-4-7 di­
agonal linkage. Governmental polici�s 
and decisions mirror politically-based 
values and goals, and are realisable 
through the application of planning 
method. Etzioni's and the Fainsteins' 
correlation of political value systems 
with rational, incremental and other 
planning procedures highlight the con­
junction of political systems with plan­
ning methodology. Some political cli­
mates are amenable to participatory 
processes while others are not and in­
cline toward processes that accommo­
date pre-determined policy ends. Fur­
ther, the procedural mode of planning 
must be a response to a particular issue 
or problem, which cannot but be a 
reflection of socio-economic condi­
tions - which are, in turn, a manifesta­
tion of the resource-distributive goals 
of the political system. 
Turbulent socio-economic conditions 
may preclude the use of sophisticated, 
time-consuming methodologies, and 
call for the adoption of less complex, 
possibly piece-meal, planning proce­
dures; the environmental orientation of 
the traditional comprehensive planning 
approach has applicability in physical 
improvement programmes. The latter 
serves as an illustration of the ethical 
stance/planning procedure/spatial or­
ganization (3-4-5) combination. Inner 
city physical renovation requires of the · 
planner a clear sense of responsibility in 
respect of the affected community, and 
the formulation of a modus operandi 
that is compatible with those commu­
nity-directed concerns. 
The above examples seek to demon­
strate the inter-dependency and interac­
tion of the elements of planning theory. 
On this basis, the conception of the syn­
optic procedure as a methodological 
approach based primarily on the 
premises of rationality and divorced 
from the socio-political surrounds of 
planning has limited validity. 
It has validity only where planning 
methodology and procedural planning 
theory are seen as synonymous and pro­
cedural theory is perceived as an ab­
stract model for decision-making: an 
intellectual· construct, a "discipline of 
the mind which does not itself make 
claims about the nature of reality" 
(Thomas, 1985:58). But this denies 
both the historical development of the 
procedural base of planning and the use 
of the rational-comprehensive process 
in practice. The incipient Geddesian 
survey-analysis-plan procedure was de­
vised precisely as a means of ensuring 
that factual societal data formed the 
basis of the plan-making process. This 
procedure has, over the decades, been 
expanded by the incorporation of the 
principles of systems and decision the­
ory, but its application remains tied to 
real-world-derived data. The manner in 
which the data has been interpreted and 
has been procedurally applied may well 
be open to criticism on social, political 
and ideological grounds, but the fact re­
mains that the data is fed into the 
procedural model and the model is used 
as a practical methodological medium 
for addressing and seeking to resolve 
planning problems in the real world. 
5. SOUTH AFRICA
The planning situation in..,the Republic 
of South Africa provides an example of 
the working of the elemental linkages 
outlined in the synthetic framework. 
While there is today a universal aware­
ness of the untenable conditions per­
taining in the Republic under the doc­
trine of apartheid, less is known of the 
effect of the separatist racial policy on 
planning activity and procedures. 
Apartheid has in fact given planning in 
South Africa a "split personality, two 
faces, clearly evident in the marked 
differentiation in ethical approach in 
planning for the Blacks and Whites. 
Planning for the White group ha� been 
prescriptively permissive, that for the 
Black sector has assumed a form of 
puppetry played out under the guiding 
hand of the state" (Muller 1983: 18). 
Thus, "planning in South Africa emer­
ges as a comparatively mildly con­
straining process in the White social 
system and as a highly constraining 
process in the Black social system". 
(Fair and Muller 1981: 179). Since plan­
ning for the White group follows by and 
large the conventions of the British 
planning system and the operation of 
the free market, it reflects only partially 
the workings of government policy. 
Planning for the Black majority has 
however been an integral activity in the 
implementation of the apartheid policy 
and illustrates well the interaction be­
tween context, substance and proce­
dure. 
The political system is clearly manifest 
in the spatial organization of South 
African society. Separation in space is 
evident at the national level in, the form 
of designated "homelands" for the var­
ious Black tribal groups, four of which 
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have opted for self-rule or autonomy -
albeit under conditions of economic 
dependency on the Republic. Racial 
segregation is more tangible in the ur­
ban areas of South Africa where the 
lower income Black population is, typi­
cally, housed in extensive dormitory set­
tlements on the urban fringe. A com­
parison of the density and environ­
mental patterns between these settle­
ments and White suburbia provides a 
clear picture of socio-economic dif­
ferentiation in the cities. 
Planning for urban regions is currently 
executed under the Guide Plan proce­
dure of the government Department of 
Constitutional Development and Plan­
ning. These Guide Plans designate long 
term land uses on, inter alia, the basis of 
state policy for industrial location and 
population distribution. The Guide 
Plan, which is a binding legal docu­
ment, is a blueprint (that product of a 
discredited form of planning) and 
makes little concession to the prospect 
or inevitability of change. The proce­
dure that spawns the Guide Plan is 
perhaps best described as a modifi_ed 
version of the comprehensive planning 
approach. It certainly cannot be con­
strued as rationalistic since the proce­
dure is constrained in terms of alterna­
tives and the like, and is exclu�ionary in 
respect of purpose. It is a process that is 
oriented toward the protection of the 
interests of the White minority and is 
thus consistent with the prevailing po­
litical ideology. 
The role of the planner operating 
within such procedural parameters can 
be construed as that of the apolitical 
technical expert. It is a role centred 
around the production of means to 
meet the predetermined ends of state 
policy. As Catanese (1984:59) says "The 
apolitical-technical planner uses tradi­
tional techniques and methods of plan­
ning ... They try to perform these tech­
nical functions without invoking their 
political and social values, although 
many will acknowledge that this is not 
always possible". This latter comment 
pushes role definition toward ethical 
considerations. There is an ethical 
judgement in the formulation of a pro­
blem - about what is included in the 
problem - and there is consequently 
an ethical attitude in the adoption of a 
planning procedure which seeks to re­
solve the problem. It must accordingly 
be concluded that those planners, con-
tributing directly to the implementation 
of the state's objectives have an ethical 
stance congruent with apartheid ideol­
ogy. 
But this is, in my view, a negation of the 
ideology of planning; a dismissal of the 
principles on which planning was 
founded and on which its philosophical 
superstructure has been built. The 19th 
century seeds of modern planning were 
planted in the fertile bed of social re­
form in Great Britain and the United 
States: in the sanitary, public health and 
housing reform movements which 
sought to expose and remove the repre­
hensible living conditions of the 
labouring poor (Muller, 1983). This dis­
ciplinary responsibility to the disadvan­
taged sector of society remains an ethi­
cal imperative today. At a time of tur­
bulance and change in South Africa, 
that responsibility must be recognized 
by the planning fraternity and must be 
translated into role and procedure. This 
must be done in the interests of the 
credibility, and hence effectiveness, of 
the planning profession in the changed 
social order of the future. 
6. CONCLUSION
The foregoing brief review of South 
African planning illustrates the fun­
damental linkages that join political 
system, institutional structure, socio­
economic conditions and spatial order 
with planning role and ethical stance. 
The practical inter-relationship of the 
various elements with planning proce­
dure places questions at the door of the 
convention that separates the substan­
tive and procedural components of 
planning theory. Further, if theoretical 
rigour precludes the meshing of fields 
of planning theory then, in th.e quest to 
improve the efficacy of planning-in­
practice, it is defensible and sensible to 
extract pertinent elements from the cor­
pus of theory and link these to planning 
procedure. Such synthesis is necessary 
if planning theory is to support and be 
complementary to practice. 
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